THE PHILOSOPHICAL NEWTON Andrew Janiak, Newton as Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ISBN 13 978-0-521-86286-8 (hardback), ISBN 13 978-0-511-41404-6 (eBook), pp. 196 by Grigore VIDA
THE PHILOSOPHICAL NEWTON 
 
Andrew Janiak, Newton as Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
ISBN 13 978-0-521-86286-8 (hardback), ISBN 13 978-0-511-41404-6 (eBook), pp.  
196 
 
Grigore VIDA
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
 
 
When  Newton  is  referring  to  his  works,  he  usually  speaks  about  “my 
Philosophy.” The reader who opens the third edition of the Principia is announced 
on  the  first  page  that  he  will  learn  about  “Newtoni  Principia  Philosophiæ.” 
Moreover,  eighteenth-century  expositions  of  the  Newtonian  achievements  – 
whether by Henry Pemberton, Colin MacLaurin or Voltaire – are always claiming to 
present  “Newton’s  Philosophy.”1  In  those  days,  a  title  like  Newton  as  Philosopher 
would have made little sense, since it was obvious that he was one, and not so 
obvious what else he could have been.  
Today, however, such a title can sound provocative. Newton is not a very 
familiar figure in most of the histories of philosophy. He gets to be mentioned in 
connection  with  the Leibniz-Clarke  correspondence,  as  holding  a  conception  of 
space  that  is  usually  so  oversimplified  that  it has  nothing  to do  with  Newton’s 
original  intention;  this  happens  especially  in  the  caricature  view  that  the  main 
problems of early modern philosophy found their solution in Kant. But here is 
someone who has arrived at Newton by studying Kant and now devotes a book to 
the strictly philosophical part of the author of the Principia; Andrew Janiak declares 
from the very beginning that “this is a work in the history of philosophy” (p. vii). 
He  does  this  after  a  2004  edition  of  Newton’s  Philosophical  Writings,2  where 
technicalities from mathematics or rational mechanics are carefully avoided. This 
type of approach is not a novelty; especially J. E. McGuire’s studies3 have shown 
that the ‘philosophical Newton’ can be extremely rich. But a monographic treatment 
of  Newton’s  philosophy  such  as  Janiak’s  is  certainly  something  rare  and  to  be 
welcomed, since it does justice to a side of Newton that has an important place 
among the various other sides (alchemy, scriptural theology etc.) that balance the 
usual ‘hero of science’ image. 
As it is evident from above and as Janiak writes, “[t]o treat Newton as a 
philosopher might simply be to avoid an [anachronism]” (p. 1), reflecting in this way 
Newton’s  own  self-conception.  The  problem  is  that  Newton’s  concept  of 
philosophy  is  radically  different  from  ours  and  Janiak  tends  to  conflate  them. 
Although sometimes Newton speaks distinctively (and in the same context) about 
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“philosophy” and “natural philosophy,” there is no clear-cut distinction between the 
two.4  As  for  today,  it  is  hard  to  define  what  philosophy  is,  but  it  is  certainly 
separated from physico-mathematical inquiries. Instead, natural philosophy could be 
lacking anything that would be labeled today as ‘philosophical’ and still be natural 
philosophy.  Of  course,  natural  philosophy  could  contain  elements  that  we 
straightforwardly call metaphysical or epistemological, but not necessarily. My point 
is that taking Newton as a philosopher in our sense does not reflect the way he 
considered  himself.  This  is  worth  emphasizing  because  one  might  get  the 
impression  that  Janiak  puts  weight  on  historical  accuracy;  but  this  is  largely  an 
illusion. His analyses are conceptual, while historical considerations play little, if any, 
role. 
Such an approach is absolutely legitimate, but it has some limitations. For 
instance,  Janiak  constantly  insists  on  the  idea  that  Newton  is  “contesting  the 
mechanical philosophy” (chapters 3 and 4 bear this expression in their title). He 
takes Newton to be using the word “mechanical” in a technical sense, namely as 
something  operating only on  the  surfaces of  bodies;  consequently,  the  cause  of 
gravity cannot be mechanical, since it is proportional to the whole quantity of matter 
in  a  body  (pp.  75-76).  But  “mechanical”  could  mean  a  lot  of  things  in  the 
seventeenth  century  and  the  “mechanical  philosophy”  is  something  sufficiently 
vague so as to have Newton included within it (like Richard Westfall or the Halls 
did). 5 To be sure, Newton changed his mind so many times regarding the cause of 
gravity,  that it is hard to ascribe him an overarching position; he was very cautious 
about committing himself and it seems that he always left the door open for a 
mechanical explanation. The ether-queries appended to the second English edition 
(1717)  of  the  Opticks  are  his  last  words  on  this  subject  and  they  bear  a  strong 
‘mechanical’ flavor. 
The  technical  meaning  of  “mechanical”  also  helps  Janiak  to  argue  that 
although Newton rejects the mechanical philosophy, he does not accept action at a 
distance: not all local action is impact or surface (i. e. mechanical) action, as Leibniz 
contended. For Janiak the denial of distant action as “unconceivable” in the famous 
letter  to  Bentley6  is  fundamental.  God’s  actions  are  always  local,  since  he  is 
everywhere and, moreover, bodies do not encounter resistance from his presence; 
this makes God a serious candidate for the cause of gravity (although it should be 
noted  that  Newton  oscillated  on  this  topic).  The  way  Janiak  puts  these  things 
together certainly makes sense, but some recent critics of his interpretation (most 
notably John Henry and Eric Schliesser)7 hold that the letter to Bentley is not only 
overemphasized, but it can also be put upside down on a careful reading, so that 
Newton is in fact not denying that gravity acts at a distance – and this is how 
eighteenth-century readers understood Newtonian gravity. 
But  Janiak  makes  another  interesting  point  about  action  at  a  distance. 
Sometime in the final stages of editing the second edition of the Principia, Roger 
Cotes sent Newton a letter in which he pressed him to accept distant action, as 
being implied by the application of the third law of motion to bodies that are not  
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contiguous.  In  his  reply,  Newton  avoided  to  answer  Cotes’  objection.  Usually 
Newton was persuaded by arguments from physical theory, but this case seems to 
be an exception. For Janiak, Newton’s reluctance is explained by his unwillingness 
to change his conception about God acting only locally. This means that Newton’s 
ideas about God, or what Janiak calls “divine metaphysics,” are immune to revisions 
determined by physical theory; such revisions are restricted only for the “mundane 
metaphysics” or “physical metaphysics.” The latter one was put forward by adepts 
of Newton “the radical empiricist” - like Howard Stein or Robert DiSalle, - and 
Janiak  essentially  agrees  with  them,  except  when  it  comes  to  God.  It  could  be 
argued, however, that the interaction between Newton’s theology and his natural 
science is less static than Janiak presents it, especially if we think at Newtonian 
cosmology. 
Although debatable, Janiak’s theses are composing a coherent picture and 
they can also set up an agenda. 
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